A person can be sincere, principled, courageous, consistent—and wrong.
That possibility troubles me more than hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is relatively easy to understand. Someone professes one standard while knowingly living by another, and once the contradiction is exposed, we know where the failure occurred. Integrity presents a more difficult problem because the person may actually believe what he says, live according to what he believes, accept the consequences of those convictions and still arrive at a judgment that is unjust.
I have been thinking about this since watching Absence of Malice, which prompted an earlier reflection on the difference between intending no harm and bearing responsibility for harm nevertheless caused.
But the question has followed me into another work I have returned to many times over the years, Herman Melville’s Billy Budd. The connection between the two initially seemed unlikely. One is a twentieth-century film about journalism and prosecutorial power; the other is a nineteenth-century novella set aboard a British warship. Yet both place decent people inside systems of law and responsibility and then ask those systems to handle circumstances more complicated than their categories.
The central event in Billy Budd is brutally simple when reduced to fact. Billy, a young sailor, is falsely accused of mutiny by John Claggart, the ship’s master-at-arms. Billy has a speech impediment that becomes pronounced under emotional pressure, and when Captain Vere orders him to answer the accusation, Billy cannot get the words out. In frustration he strikes Claggart. The blow kills him.
The facts are not especially difficult. Their meaning is.
Billy has killed a superior officer aboard a British warship during wartime, when mutiny is not an abstract concern and discipline is considered essential to the survival of the ship. Captain Vere understands the legal implications immediately. He also understands Billy. He has witnessed the accusation, Billy’s inability to respond and the spontaneous blow. He knows this is not a calculated murder. In one of the great tensions of the story, Vere possesses enough knowledge to recognize Billy’s moral innocence while simultaneously possessing enough knowledge of military law to recognize his legal guilt.
And then he has to decide. (now you know where part 3 will go- back to "Invidious").
This is where I have become increasingly reluctant to make Vere either hero or villain. He is much more interesting than either designation allows. He does not casually sacrifice Billy to an impersonal rule, nor does Melville allow him the comfort of pretending the circumstances are uncomplicated. Vere wrestles because several genuine obligations have collided. He has a responsibility to Billy, but he also has a responsibility to the sailors under his command. He has obligations to military law, to the preservation of order aboard the ship and to his own conscience. Relaxing discipline in wartime may carry consequences well beyond one sympathetic sailor; enforcing it may require condemning a man Vere knows did not act with murderous intent.
Integrity does not solve that problem.
In fact, integrity may make it more painful.
We often speak of integrity as though it were the final measure of moral character, and certainly I would rather deal with a person of integrity than one without it. But integrity describes the relationship between conviction and conduct. A person of integrity attempts to act consistently with what he believes to be true and right. What integrity cannot guarantee is that his beliefs are correct, that his information is complete, or that the principles he is applying adequately account for the situation in front of him.
I wish life was black and white- but we are often struggling to live in a vast sea of gray.
A compass can point faithfully in the direction it has been designed to indicate. That does not guarantee that the traveler has correctly identified the destination.
This is where Billy Budd begins to expose something about the limitations of law itself. Law has to generalize. It cannot be rewritten from the beginning for every person who stands before it. Rules exist precisely because societies, institutions and organizations cannot survive if every judgment depends entirely upon the sympathies of whoever happens to possess authority at the moment.
There is wisdom in that. History provides plenty of reasons to distrust a system in which powerful people simply decide which rules should apply to whom.
But human beings are stubbornly particular - The law sees an act: a sailor struck and killed a superior officer.
Vere sees Billy. Both are true, and yet they are not identical truths.
That distinction reminded me again of the line that first caught my attention in Absence of Malice: something can be accurate without being true. A description can correctly identify every relevant external fact and still fail to capture the reality of the person involved. “Billy Budd killed John Claggart” is accurate. If that sentence becomes the whole account of Billy Budd, however, something essential has disappeared.
Law inevitably performs some version of this reduction. It must translate complicated human events into categories that can be administered: intentional or accidental, guilty or innocent, permitted or prohibited, mitigating or aggravating. Good law attempts to make those categories increasingly sensitive to circumstance, motive and degree, but no category can contain the entirety of a human story.
Perhaps that is one reason judgment ought to produce some degree of trepidation in the person entrusted with it.
I have spent much of my adult life in roles that required decisions affecting other people, and I have never found the most consequential ones to resemble the clean scenarios presented in policy manuals. Usually the policy is the easy part. The difficulty lies in determining what actually happened, weighing accounts that do not completely agree, distinguishing explanation from excuse, considering precedent, anticipating consequences and remembering that the person standing in front of you will continue living with the decision after you have moved on to the next item on the calendar.
There are times when leadership requires decisiveness. Endless hesitation can become its own form of irresponsibility. But I have become increasingly suspicious of judgment that comes too easily.
Trepidation is not necessarily evidence of weakness. Sometimes it may be evidence that a person understands what judgment requires. To make a consequential decision about another human being while remaining conscious of how much one does not know seems healthier to me than the confidence that comes from believing the title, position, policy or law has somehow eliminated uncertainty.
Captain Vere wrestles with it- but you can't detach yourself in the situation- you are in the moment AND your perception of yourself and the consequences live there as well.
He has authority, but authority has not given him omniscience. He knows a great deal about what occurred in that cabin, perhaps more than almost anyone could reasonably expect a judge to know, and still he is forced to make a decision whose moral dimensions exceed the facts available to him.
That may be the deeper limitation we sometimes attribute to law when the limitation actually belongs to us. Laws are written by human beings, interpreted by human beings and applied to human beings. Every stage of the process passes through limited knowledge, experience, judgment and perspective. We try to compensate for those limitations with evidence, testimony, precedent, deliberation, appeals and multiple levels of review. Those safeguards are sometimes criticized as cumbersome, but perhaps they are better understood as institutional acknowledgments of something we are reluctant to admit individually: a sincere person can be sincerely mistaken.
And sincerity combined with conviction can actually increase the consequences of the mistake.
Consider a person whose reasoning is internally consistent. He believes a certain set of facts to be true. He applies a moral principle to those facts. He reaches the conclusion demanded by that principle and then, because he possesses integrity, has the courage to act upon it despite pressure to do otherwise.
We normally admire almost every part of that description. But what if one of the facts is wrong? What if an important fact is missing?
What if the principle is sound but has been applied to a circumstance the decision-maker does not completely understand?
The moral reasoning may remain coherent from beginning to end while the judgment itself has been contaminated somewhere upstream.
That possibility is considerably more unsettling than discovering hypocrisy because there may be no villain to expose and no corrupt motive to uncover. The person making the decision may be trying earnestly to do what is right. He may lose sleep over it. He may accept criticism for it. He may refuse the easier course because he believes principle demands otherwise.
And he may still be wrong.
This is where I find myself returning to Captain Vere. I am less interested these days in deciding whether I would convict or acquit Billy Budd than I am in watching Vere confront the terrible inadequacy of his own position. He has been given the authority to judge, and therefore he must judge. Yet nothing about receiving that authority has made him capable of seeing the whole truth.
Perhaps the danger begins when we forget that distinction.
The most frightening person entrusted with judgment may not be the openly corrupt one. We generally know to guard ourselves against him. It may be the person of unquestioned integrity who has become completely certain that his integrity guarantees the correctness of his judgment.
Quite a pickle.
Integrity is indispensable, but integrity needs truth. And human beings possess truth imperfectly.
That leaves me with a question more uncomfortable than the one I started with. If I can act without malice and still cause harm, and if I can act with integrity and still be wrong, how confident should I be about the one thing I usually claim to know better than anyone else—my own motives?
I am not sure we know ourselves as well as we think we do.
Stew on this one for a few days and then let me present a part 3..... later.










